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Least Privilege Principle

The principle of least privilege gives every identity only the access its task needs

The principle of least privilege means each user, process or workload gets only the access its task needs and nothing more. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control AC-6, read on 16 Nov 2026, requires it for users and for processes acting on their behalf, and AWS, Azure and Google Cloud each publish guidance for applying it.

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NIST AC-6 states the requirement in one sentence

The source text is control AC-6, Least Privilege, in NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. NIST publishes it in the public domain. The control statement reads, verbatim: "Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks." The catalog entry is on the NIST CSRC catalog page for AC-6, read on 16 Nov 2026.

NIST's glossary gives the shorter definition, citing the same publication: the principle that a security architecture is designed so that each entity is granted the minimum system resources and authorizations that the entity needs to perform its function (NIST CSRC glossary, read 16 Nov 2026). The wording covers people, services and processes alike, which matters in the cloud, where most principals are not people.

The guidance paragraph adds duties, processes and roles

The AC-6 guidance says organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and systems, and apply it to system processes so that they operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary. It also says organizations consider creating additional processes, roles and accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege, and that they apply it to the development, implementation and operation of systems.

In cloud terms, that is the case for one narrow role per workload instead of one shared role for a team. It also means the pipeline that deploys a workload is in scope, since the pipeline holds an identity too. A policy document alone does not meet the control. The assessment objective is that the principle "is employed", which an assessor tests in configuration and records.

Ten enhancements turn the principle into named practices

AC-6 has ten enhancements in the Rev. 5 catalog. Several map directly to cloud work, and the table lists the ones a cloud program meets first.

EnhancementTitle in the catalogCloud practice it points to
AC-6(1)Authorize Access to Security FunctionsLimit who can change IAM, logging and key settings
AC-6(5)Privileged AccountsRestrict administrator roles to named people or roles
AC-6(7)Review of User PrivilegesScheduled access reviews with a recorded result
AC-6(9)Log Use of Privileged FunctionsAudit logging of administrator actions
AC-6(10)Prohibit Non-privileged Users from Executing Privileged FunctionsDeny rules that hold whatever roles are granted

AWS, Azure and Google Cloud give the same instruction in their own words

AWS's IAM guidance tells customers to grant only the permissions required to perform a task, by defining the actions allowed on specific resources under specific conditions. It adds that starting with AWS managed policies might not give least privilege for your use case, that Access Analyzer can generate a policy from CloudTrail activity, and that you should regularly review and remove unused users, roles, permissions, policies and credentials (AWS IAM best practices, read 16 Nov 2026).

Microsoft's Azure RBAC guidance says to grant users the least privilege to get their work done and to avoid assigning broader roles at broader scopes even if that initially seems more convenient. Google Cloud says basic roles include thousands of permissions across all services, so in production you should grant the most limited predefined or custom roles that meet your needs (Google Cloud, using IAM securely, read 16 Nov 2026).

The cloud case differs in scale and in who holds the access

In a data center, a privileged account was usually a person with a ticket. In the cloud, most principals are workloads: roles, service accounts and managed identities created by pipelines, often with broad permissions granted while a developer was exploring. AWS says as much in its own advice, that you might start broad and reduce as the use case matures.

Creation is fast and removal is slow, so the gap grows by default. The principle is unchanged and the work is different: measure use against grants, test each change before it ships, and set boundaries that remove whole classes of access. Why least privilege stalls covers where that work stops, and what a boundary is covers the third part.

To size the gap in your own estate, the Access Debt Calculator turns four counts into a clean-up estimate. The method page states its assumptions, and the first 90 days turns the estimate into a plan.

An auditor reads AC-6 as a list of records to produce

The AC-6 assessment objects name the items an assessor examines: the access control policy, procedures for least privilege, the list of assigned authorizations, system configuration settings and audit records. A program that keeps its policies as code, its change approvals and its review results in one place produces these as a by-product of the work.

The records answer two questions an assessor asks of any access: who approved it, and when it was last reviewed. A written least privilege policy supplies the first document on that list.

Sources

  1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 catalog (OSCAL JSON), control AC-6, read 16 Nov 2026
  2. NIST CSRC, SP 800-53 Rev. 5.1.1 catalog, control AC-6, read 16 Nov 2026
  3. NIST CSRC glossary, least privilege, read 16 Nov 2026
  4. AWS, security best practices in IAM, read 16 Nov 2026
  5. Microsoft, best practices for Azure RBAC, read 16 Nov 2026
  6. Google Cloud, using IAM securely, read 16 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.