# A boundary is a limit set above the grants, so one change can remove a class of access

Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

A boundary is a rule that caps what the grants below it can do, whatever those grants say. AWS, Google Cloud and Azure each document one: a ceiling on a role, a limit on the resources a principal may reach, or a deny that overrides assignments. One boundary can remove many paths at once.

## A grant gives access and a boundary limits it

A grant says an identity may do something. A boundary says what no grant beneath it can allow. The two are evaluated together, and the effective result is what both permit. That is why a boundary can remove access without touching the grants: the broad role stays in place and the boundary makes parts of it inert. The same shape appears in every cloud, though the names and evaluation rules differ.

This page uses the word in the general sense and names one example per cloud to show the shape. A reader should not expect the three examples below to behave alike, since each cloud evaluates its own policy types in its own order. The mechanisms side by side are on [least privilege access control](/least-privilege-access-control/).

## Each cloud documents its own version

AWS documents a permissions boundary as an advanced feature that uses a managed policy to set the maximum permissions an identity-based policy can grant to an IAM user or role. The entity can perform only the actions allowed by both its identity-based policies and its boundary. It is a ceiling on one identity and grants nothing itself.

Google Cloud documents Principal Access Boundary policies as policies that define the resources principals can access. They attach to principal sets, in contrast to allow and deny policies, which attach to resources. Google gives the example of preventing principals from accessing resources in other organizations, and notes that by default principals are eligible to access any Google Cloud resource, so the boundary narrows an otherwise open default.

Microsoft documents deny assignments in Azure RBAC as attaching a set of deny actions to a user, group or service principal at a scope, blocking those actions even if a role assignment grants them. The page also covers listing them, which is the first step in learning which denies already exist in your tenant.

## A boundary removes a class and a clean-up removes an item

A permission-by-permission clean-up deletes one grant per change and has to be repeated for every identity. A boundary applied at an organization, folder or account level acts on every identity beneath it at once. If the boundary denies a service nobody uses, a region nobody runs in, or access from outside the organization, thousands of grants become irrelevant in one change. The comparison is between ten thousand edits and one reviewed policy.

The [Access Debt Calculator](/) puts numbers on that comparison: it sizes a permission-by-permission plan and a boundary plan from the same counts, and shows the arithmetic on the [methodology page](/methodology/). [Why least privilege stalls](/why-least-privilege-stalls/) explains why the first plan rarely finishes.

## A boundary needs a simulation more than a grant does

Because a boundary acts on many identities, its mistakes are wide. A deny that is slightly too broad blocks a deployment role in forty accounts at the same moment. The same reach that makes a boundary efficient makes an untested one dangerous. Release should be gradual for the same reason, starting with the accounts that have the fewest dependencies, and the list of affected principals needs an owner for each.

The practical rule is to replay recent access under the proposed boundary, list every principal that would change outcome, and release it in audit mode first. Google's Policy Intelligence includes simulators for deny policies and Principal Access Boundary policies, and AWS provides a policy simulator for testing IAM policies.

## A boundary should be written down in version control

Whichever cloud enforces it, the audit question is the same: where is the boundary written down, who can change it, and how would you know that someone did. A boundary stored only in a console is a boundary with no history. Keeping it as code in version control is the simplest answer, since a pull request records the author, the reviewer and the date.

The written [policy template](/least-privilege-policy-template/) puts these three answers in section 5.

## Related pages

- [Principle of least privilege: definition and NIST AC-6](/principle-of-least-privilege/)
- [Privilege creep in the cloud: causes and how to measure it](/privilege-creep/)
- [Least privilege access: how access is granted and limited](/least-privilege-access/)

## Sources

- AWS, permissions boundaries for IAM entities: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Google Cloud, Principal Access Boundary policies: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/principal-access-boundary-policies (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft, list Azure deny assignments: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/deny-assignments (read 16 Nov 2026)
- AWS, testing IAM policies with the policy simulator: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_testing-policies.html (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Google Cloud, Policy Simulator for allow policies: https://cloud.google.com/policy-intelligence/docs/iam-simulator-overview (read 16 Nov 2026)
- AWS, service control policies: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html (read 16 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://leastprivilegeprinciple.com/what-a-boundary-is/
